


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# SPECIAL REPORT

SHIFTING JAPANESE ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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**SHIFTING JAPANESE ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE**

The deep antimilitarist feelings which prevailed in postwar Japan are gradually fading. Public attitudes show some signs of mellowing, and the Ikeda government is slowly building up the country's defense forces and adopting a posture more openly sympathetic toward them. A constitutional ban on armed forces as such still hampers the build-up, however, and Japanese opinion is far from persuaded of Japan's need to maintain a defense establishment commensurate with its booming economy and growing role in world affairs.

Background

The Japanese nation's total sense of shame after World War II and the shock of military defeat after decades of propaganda on the country's invincibility brought national rejection of all institutions associated with the military. Communists, extreme leftists, and pacifists--newly freed from the restrictions which curbed their activities in prewar Japan--helped generate a climate of opinion in which Japan's position of unarmed neutrality in the East-West struggle became popular. Intellectuals--professors and schoolteachers--of this persuasion were influential in furthering this attitude among young people. The deep impact of these views is evident still.

Pacifism was institutionalized in Article IX of the constitution drawn up in 1946. This renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and declares that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war

potential will never be maintained."

This seemingly absolute limitation began to be circumvented in 1950, when a quasi-military force called the National Police Reserve was created to fill the internal security vacuum created when US forces began to leave Japan for Korea. Four years later the fiction was carried further. A law was passed establishing the Japanese Defense Agency as a bureau within the prime minister's office, to administer what was called a Self-Defense Force (SDF). In 1959 the Supreme Court approved the SDF's legal status, but as long as Article IX remains on the books, an air of uncertainty prevails over Japan's military establishment.

Armed Force Without Support

The Defense Agency today is controlled by civilian officials determined to prevent any resurgence of militarism. The score of senior civilians who

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FIGURE 1

JAPAN'S NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET

Fiscal Year *	Million US Dollars	% of Total Budget	% of GNP
1960	493.8	10.8	1.72
1961	493.6	9.8	1.43
1962	579	8.6	1.1
1963	670	8.5	1.2
1964	764.4	8.1	1.1 (est)

\* 1 April - 31 March

FIGURE 3

MANPOWER IN JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES  
(Fiscal Year 1963)

	Planned	Authorized	Actual
Ground	171,500	144,060	141,002
Maritime	39,291	33,291	32,024
Air	41,757	39,057	37,176
TOTALS	252,548	216,408	210,202

FIGURE 2

MAJOR GOALS OF JAPAN'S SECOND LONG-RANGE DEFENSE BUILDUP PLAN  
(Fiscal Years 1962 - 1966)

Budget:

Annual increase of \$51.1 - 59.7 million in defense spending, with the goal of reaching \$761.7 in final year of plan.

Ground Self-Defense Force:

Manpower strength of 180,000 (8,500 over previous legally authorized strength), Nike and Hawk missile battalions, 2 of each.

Maritime Self-Defense Force:

39 new ships to replace 28 obsolete vessels, resulting in an over-all tonnage increase from 119,000 tons at beginning of plan to 143,000 tons.

Air Self-Defense Force:

Continuance of modernization program, goal of 1,030 aircraft at end of planning period. Acquisition of semi-automatic tactical air weapon system--i.e., base air defense ground environment (BADGE) system.

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manage the defense program tolerate only limited assistance from the professional soldier in formulating policy.

The military services are demoralized by an official attitude which they feel pays only lip service to the importance of defense forces and a popular attitude which remains generally cool to defense needs. As a result, the efficiency of the

military establishment has suffered. According to some informed critics, the SDF is less concerned with fulfilling its primary mission of defending the homeland than it is with pay rates, retirement benefits, and personal gain.

The SDF relies on voluntary recruitment for a two-year term of service to fill its ranks, and laws allow recruits to

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resign at any time. The generally low regard for the man in uniform reduces the quality of recruit, especially in the ground forces, and the turnover rate is a continuing problem. The SDF is currently 4 percent below its budgeted strength (see figure 3).

A surplus of candidates is available nevertheless for the Defense Academy and for officer candidates' schools. However, since Japan's institutions of higher learning today are overcrowded and competition for admission is keen, the surfeit of applicants for the service schools is possibly attributable more to the desire for an education than for a military career.

Those who do choose the SDF as a career are plagued by the uncertainty of serving in an unpopular force with a precarious legal position, and by the realization that constitutional bans on a military justice system make it difficult to maintain discipline in the ranks. There are, moreover, constitutional interpretations which preclude military conscription and certain weapons of modern warfare such as longer range rockets and missiles.

The Government's Attitude

Despite the drawbacks, the Japanese Government, while still relying primarily on American protection, has been slowly building up its defense forces for several years. The mainstay is the US-Japan Mutual Security

Treaty of 1960, which provides maximum security at a minimum cost to Japan.

Japan is midway through its second five-year Long Range Defense Buildup Plan (1962-66) (see figure 2). Under this plan the country's absolute defense spending has steadily mounted (see figure 1), but the defense share of the government's total budget and of the gross national product (GNP) during a time of dynamic economic conditions has been easing off. The 1.1 percent of the estimated GNP allocated for defense in the current budget ranks well below that of European NATO countries, which by the most recent figures spent an average of 6 percent of GNP for defense in 1962. The smallest spender, Luxembourg, devoted an estimated 1.5 percent of the GNP to defense.

Nevertheless, the government of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda appears to be taking an increasingly positive attitude toward defense. The revision of Article IX as part of a larger program of constitutional revision has been discussed tentatively. Elements of Ikeda's Liberal Democratic Party have offered a bill to elevate the Defense Agency to the status of a fully independent ministry.

Government leaders now are willing to associate themselves publicly with the military establishment. Ikeda for several years has taken the salute from the SDF at parades marking the establishment of the force and

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in recent months has made speaking appearances before meetings of the senior SDF commanders. The Emperor, too, has become involved. In December 1962, he reviewed for the first time an SDF honor guard.

### Popular Views Easing

There are also some signs that popular apathy or outright hostility toward the military may gradually be turning into an attitude of acceptance. In a recent public opinion poll a majority--52 percent--approved of Japan's maintaining the self-defense forces. In a similar poll five years ago only 39 percent approved.

The press too is beginning to devote space to serious presentation of military problems, including those dealing with nuclear weapons. Several years ago these same newspapers were the major mirrors of pacifism and neutralism, if not major contributors to such sentiments.

Interest in Japan's military exploits in the 1941-45 "Pacific War" is also growing, and war films and war songs are becoming popular. Sales of war toys and games are reviving. Veterans' organizations are experiencing a resurgence, and organizations of parents of men now in the SDF are being established.

### Ikeda Treads Softly

Ikeda nevertheless sees ample evidence that Japan is not yet ready for any substantial or speedy remilitarization. The tentative moves toward constitutional revision have brought charges from the socialist opposition that the government is reverting to a pre-1945 style of militarism and is plotting with big business interests to undertake full-scale rearmament. The government's only major effort to "sell" the SDF has been in the area of public works and disaster relief. Indeed, the most welcome SDF elements are engineer units which are locally regarded as a source of heavy machinery and of manpower for public construction projects--to which unit commanders are instructed to provide maximum assistance.

A further reason for caution is the division of opinion within Ikeda's LDP. Some party members remain sharply opposed to any moves to bolster the defense establishment. In the face of this vocal minority, Ikeda has allowed the bill establishing a full-fledged defense ministry to fall to the end of the legislative calendar. This position almost certainly kills it for this year's session of the Diet. This tactic may cause trouble for Ikeda at the LDP convention next month if opposing faction leaders think sufficient mileage can be

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generated from this issue to upset his bid for an unprecedented third term as party president.

Outlook

Ikeda thinks of Japan as one of the three pillars of the free world, along with Western Europe and the United States. If he could have it his way, he would probably move rapidly toward

his military goals, and in so doing he would like to take advantage of the renewed sense of national self-confidence and independence inspired by the nation's spectacular economic revival. However, for this generation at least, popular revulsion to war will continue to deter any drastic revision of the present go-slow policy.

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